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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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MOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD STRANG, KATHRYN 
STRANG, 'VENDY HARVEY and 
MINDAL YN GREEN, by her 




Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the granting of a summary 
judgment to plaintiff-respondent decreeing that the 
policy of automobile public liability insurance issued 
by respondent afforded no insurance coverage to Wendy 
HarYev the sister-in-law and sister of Ronald Strang . ' 
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claim is made by appellant that an insurance policy 
covering another vehicle owned by Mrs. Hamberlin 
applied to the J;-,alcon automobile because of the time 
lapse from the date of acquisition of that vehicle to 
the date of the subject accident. The record in this case 
is somewhat brief and is basically confined to the de-
claratory judgment complaint, answer of the defend-
ants, the judgment of the lower court, four short 
depositions, that of Ronald Strang, Wendy Harvey, 
Debra Hamberlin and Jacqueline Hamberlin, her 
mother, and the insurance policy to be interpreted. 
During the course of appellant's brief reference will be 
made to Exhibit 1, which is the policy to be interpreted, 
and each of the depositions by name and page. 
On the date in question, Debra Hamberlin was age 
1.5 and was not a licensed driver. Mrs. Hamberlin had 
left the keys to the Falcon home on the drainboard so 
that her 20-year-old son, Debra's brother, could move 
the car, at her request, within the driveway. Debra had, 
on several occasions, taken the Falcon, advising her 
friends that the car was hers and that she had her 
mother's permission to drive it. This was unknown to 
the mother. On this date, 'Vendy Harvey was a guest 
at the residence of a common girl friend who was a 
neighbor of Debra. Wendy had an errand to run and 
Debra volunteered to drive her on the errand (Harvey 
deposition, p. 4). During the course of driving on this 
occasion and on the previous two occasions, Debra had 
publicly declared that the subject Falcon was her auto-
mobile (Harvey deposition, p. 5). On the date in 
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and Kathryn Strang, defendants named in this case, 
for negligent acts arising out of driving the subject non. 
owned automobile. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the lower court judg-
ment decreeing no insurance coverage and the entry 
of a judgment on appellant's motion for summary judg-
ment decreeing that respondent's insurance policy ap-
plied to the subject accident in the event liability exists 
on the part of 'V endy Harvey. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of July 30, 1970, the minor 
appellant, Mindalyn Green, was playing at her resi-
dence in an apartment complex in Granger, Utah with 
some of her friends. She was injured as a result of 
being struck by an automobile driven by Wendy 
Harvey, a 15-year-old nonlicensed driver, who appel-
lants claim lost control of the vehicle she was driving. 
Wendy was a resident of the Strang household and had 
been for approximately five years, legal custody having 
been given to her sister, Kathryn Strang. 
The automobile in question was a 1964 Falcon 
owned and registered to one Jacqueline Hamberlin, 
a widow. Mrs. Hamberlin maintained no policy of 
public liability insurance covering said vehicle and no 
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Absent exclusionary riders, Wendy Harvey is an 
insured regardless of age or no driver's license under 
the Strang family auto policy. State Farm Mutual v. 
Walker, (Texas, 1960), 334 S.W.2d 458. 
Exhibit 1 being the insurance policy in question at 
page 3 contains the following language, some of which 
is set forth in plaintiff's complaint for a declaratory 
judgment. The Strangs are the owners of the liability 
policy in question and Wendy Harvey is a resident 
of their household. 
"USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMO-
BILES. If the named insured is a person or 
persons, and if during the policy period such 
named insured owns a motor vehicle covered by 
this policy and classified as 'pleasure and busi-
ness', such insurance as is afforded by this policy 
with respect to the owned motor vehicle under: 
( 1) coverages A and B (public liability and 
property damage) apply to the use of a non-
owned automobile by: 
(a) the first person named in the declarations, 
or 
( b) if residents of the same household, his 
spouse or the relatives of either, and 
( c) * * * (not applicable) 
( 2) * * * (not applicable) 
PROVIDED SUCH USE, OPERATION 
OR OCCUPANCY IS WITH THE PER-
MISSION OF THE O"\VNER OR PER-
SON IN LAT¥FUL POSSESSION OF 
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question, while driving, the following conversation took 
place: 
"A. Well, we were driving and I said something 
like 'It would be fun to drive' and Debbie said. 
''V ell, here, do you want to drive?' and I said' 
'Yes,' " (Harvey Deposition, p. 5) ' 
thereby resulting in Wendy's driving the Falcon. It was 
not until after the accident that 'V endy first met Mrs. 
Hamberlin and was advised that Debra did not have 
permission to take the subject automobile (Harvey depo-
sition p. 7) . 
Respondent becomes involved in this lawsuit since 
it had issued a policy of liability insurance to the Strangs 
which insures \V endy Harvey as a bona fide resident 
of the household under the omnibus clause of that policy. 
The subject insurance policy contains no exclusionary 
clause for under age or nonlicensed drivers and, there-
fore, that defense is not available and has not been 
raised by State Farm. The matter to be decided by this 
Court is solely whether or not Wendy qualifies as an 
insured under State Farm's omnibus clause on the facts 
of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ON APPEAL 
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN CON-
CLUDING STATE FARM WAS NOT AN IN-
SURER OF WENDY HARVEY AGAINST 
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF DRIVING. 
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SUCH AU1101l10BILE AND IS JVl11IIIN 
THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION." 
(emphasis added) 
It is admitted that the operation or occupancy of 
the vehicle causing the serious personal injuries to 
Mindalyn Green was not with the permission of Mrs. 
Jacqueline Hamberlin, the owner of the vehicle. How-
ever, appellant submits that her daughter, Debra, was 
a person in lawful possession of the automobile and the 
several excerpts from the record quoted in the State-
ment of Facts places the use at the time of injury 
"within the scope of such permission" (Debra's per-
mission) and the question of the lawfulness of Debra's 
possession is the point on which this case should turn. 
The Court will notice that two classifications of persons 
can grant permission to drive the auto as the clause is 
in the disjunctive. 
Taking public policy considerations first, for whose 
benefit is a policy of public liability insurance intended? 
Appellant submits the intended benefit is to be derived 
from the name of the policy-public liability-and the 
interests of the public for whose design and benefit such 
policies are written should receive first consideration. 
Mrs. Hamberlin admittedly has no liability under the 
facts of this case. Her daughter, Debra, could possibly 
have some joint liability with the driver under a theory 
of negligent entrustment if the facts could be estab-
lished in support of that theory. To permit State Farm 
to stand in the shoes of Mrs. Hamberlin under a stolen 
vehicle theory when the vehicle has been used by her 
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own daughter upon representations to her friends as 
to ownership and entitlement to use same, as evidenced 
by her past conduct (Harvey Deposition, p. 8, com-
mencing with Line 14), is unconscionable. 
Section 41-12-21 (c), Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953), as amended, sets forth minimum standards of 
insurance policy coverage and reads as follows : 
"Such operator's policy of liability insurance 
shall insure the person named as insured therein 
against loss from the liability imposed upon him 
by law for damages arising out of the use by 
him of any vehicle not owned by him . . . " 
Since 'iV endy Harvey comes under the classification 
of an insured under the Strang policy, any attempt on 
the part of State Farm to claim noncoverage would be 
in direct conflict with the foregoing statute, and its pur-
pose, which is to protect the public. Further, any clause 
which purports to limit this protection should be declared 
void. 
Mrs. Hamberlin did not treat the taking of the 
automobile as stolen for purposes of criminal action. 
(Jacqueline Hamberlin Deposition, p. 13) 
"Q. And I trust that you did not consider the car 
stolen? 
A. Well, they didn't have it with my permission. 
Q. That wasn't the question. Did you consider the 
car stolen? 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Q. You did? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you turn it in to the police? 
A. No, I didn't turn it in. I told them at the scene 
of the accident. 
Q. That she had it without your permission. 
A. vVithout my permission. 
Q. But you did not turn it in as a stolen vehicle? 
A. No. 
Q. And did you ever file any charges ? 
A. No, I did not file charges, I called my attorney." 
Notwithstanding .Mrs. Hamberlin' s personal views 
on the unauthorized use of her automobile by Debra 
and Wendy, according to the great weight of authority, 
she would not have had a civil cause of action in tort 
against her d~ter for wrongful taking of her car, 
60 A.L.R. 2d /, ~Therefore, the permission for opera-
tion, for purposes of interpreting the Strang policy, 
must necessarily exist in Debra. 
Illustrative of insurance company liability under 
auto public liability insurance clauses for drivers, not· 
withstanding the criminal taking of the car by the 
driver, which car was the instrumentality causing the 
injury, is the case of State Farm Mutual v. W allcer, 
supra, at p. 461. In Sperling v. Great American· In-
demnity Company, (1960) 7 N.Y. 2d 442, 199 N.Y.S. 
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2d 465, 166 N.E. 2d 482, 83 A.L.R. 2d 929, a 16-year-
old member of a household stole a vehicle and thereafter 
caused injuries to other persons. In holding the insur-
ance company liable for the actions of the household 
member under a more gross situation than the joy ride 
facts of the instant case, the New York Court, after 
observing the common and oft cited rule of resolving 
any ambiguities against insurance companies, made the 
following observation at page 487: 
"The insurer further contends that it would be 
against public policy to require it to pay the bulk 
of the judgment recovered against Christine, 
since she 'would accordingly be the beneficiary 
of the result of her own crimes'. This argument 
is foreclosed by the decision of this court in Mes-
sersmith v. American Fid. Co. (232 N.Y. 161, 
133 N.E. 432, 19 A.L.R. 876). 
"There was no proof in the wrongful death 
action that Christine intentionally collided with 
decedent's car nor were there allegations to that 
effect in the complaint. On the contrary, the com-
plaint was framed solely in the terms of negli-
gence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and the 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, as the insurer con-
cedes, was based solely on 'the negligence of the 
infant defendant'. The fact that Christine had 
previously misappropriated the car with .w~ic~ 
she negligently caused the death of plamhff s 
husband, was wholly irrelevant in the wrongful 
death action since 'Injuries are accidental or 
the opposite for the purpose of indemnity accord-
ing to the quality of ,the results. rather than. the 
quality of the causes. Messersmith v. American 
Fid. Co., supra, 232 N.Y. at page 165, 133 N.E. 
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at page 433; emphasis supplied. (See, also, D:wis 
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 356 Mich. 
454, 96 N.,V. 2d 760, and Sky v. Keystone Mut. 
Cas. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A. 2d 230). 
"As Judge Cardozo further pointed out in the 
JYiessersmith case (supra, 232 N.Y. at pages 
163, 164<, 133 N.E. at page 432), liability in tort 
for the negligent operation of a vehicle 'can 
seldom, if ever, be incurred without fault that is 
also crime', and 'To restrict insurance to cases 
where liability is incurred without fault of the 
insured would reduce indemnity to a shadow.' 
The insurer here has been called upon to indem-
nify Christine against the consequences of her 
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, 
not against the criminal consequences stemming 
from her willful misappropriation of the vehicle. 
The manner in which she acquired the vehicle 
had nothing whatever to do with her liability for 
its negligent operation." 
We submit that so far as Wendy Harvey is con-
cerned, she was not a tort feasor in accepting permis-
sion to drive the car,and the maxim of de minimis non 
curat lex applies since the manner in which Debra ac-
quired the car had nothing to do with Wendy's negligent 
operation of it. 
Western Casualty and Surety v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., et al., 26 U.2d 50, 484 P.2d l180, does not apply 
if raised in respondent's brief, since it is Wendy Harvey 
who is to be insured, not the automobile causing injury. 
Appellant anticipates reliance of State Farm on 
the case of Ashton v. Joyner, 17 U.2d 162, 406 P.2d 306. 
That case involved the interpretation of a theft under a 
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comprehensive damage clause of an insurance policy. 
Claim had been made by the insured for the cost of 
repairs for damages sustained to his truck, which had 
been taken without permission by his under-aged son. 
This Court held under the theft portion of the insurance 
policy in question and under the facts of that case, the 
company was liable. The rationale contained in that case 
is correct under the terms of the United Pacific policy 
to be interpreted. 
Directing the Court's attention to page 7, Exhibit 
1, Use of Non-Owned Vehicles (Physical Damage Sec-
tion) , similar coverage terminology is contained in the 
State Farm policy presently under review applying to 
physical damage loss, and is basically the same as that 
contained in the public liability provision of Exhibit 
1 applicable to non-owned vehicles quoted at the begin-
ning of Argument in this brief. This policy thus differs 
from the United Pacific policy considered in the Ashton 
case as evidenced in the briefs on file and this difference 
is the governing factor in this case. 
State Farm's policy, under which appellants con-
tend 'Vendy Harvey is an insured, is not a "standard 
form auto policy". Automobile Liability Insurance Cases, 
Standard Provisions, Isjord and Austin, (Kansas City: 
E. L. Mendenhall, Inc., 1964). As previously mentioned, 
two classes of persons can grant permission for use of 
a non-owned vehicle, i.e., owner or person in lawful 
possession of such vehicle. This terminology differs from 
the more common coverage agreements contained in 
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"standard form auto policies", applying coverage to 
non-owned automobiles. They generally provide cover-
age ( 1) to the named insured; ( 2) to any relative ( mem-
ber of the household) , but only with respect to private 
passenger automobiles or trailers, provided the actual 
use thereof is with the permission of the owner; e.g., 
Gray v. International Service Insurance Company, 
386 P.2d 249; McMichael v. American Insurance Com-
pany, 351 F.2d 665 (1965); Sperling v. Great Ameri-
can Indemnity Company, supra, at p. 484. 
CONCLUSION 
Since State Farm has selected the terminology under 
which it accepts liability for the negligent acts of its 
insureds, and Wendy Harvey qualifies as an insured, 
permission having been granted her to operate a vehicle, 
her own policy of liability insurance should apply to 
protect her and compensate the public, including but 
not limited to, Mindalyn Green for injuries sustained, 
proximately resulting from her negligence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
707 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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